Work in Progress
Working Papers and Submitted Manuscripts
- Beck, M., Ott, M.: Incentives for Overbidding in Core-Selecting Auctions. (Extends and succeeds Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions.)
- Ehrhart, K.-M., Ott, M.: Declining Prices Across Second-Price Procurement Auctions.
- Beck, M., Ott, M.: Combinatorial Auctions: Equilibrium Strategies and Outcomes.
- Ehrhart, K.-M., Ott, M.: Loss-averse Bidders in English and Dutch Auctions. (An earlier version circulated under the title Reference Dependent Bidding in Dynamic Auctions.)
- Heczko, A., Kittsteiner, T., Ott, M.: The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment.
- Kittsteiner, T., Ott, M., Steinberg. R.: Competing Combinatorial Auctions.
- Beck, M., Ott, M.: Unrelated Goods in Package Auctions - Comparing Vickrey and Core-Selecting Outcomes.
- Beck, M., Ott, M.: Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions. Working Paper. (Extends Revenue Monotonicity in Core-Selecting Package Auctions.)
- Thielmann, I., Böhm, R., Ott, M., and Hilbig, B. E.: Economic games: A gold standard for measuring and understanding prosocial behavior. Working Paper, University Koblenz-Landau.
Accepted for Publication
Ocker, F., Ehrhart, K.-M., Ott, M. (2018): Bidding Strategies in Austrian and German Balancing Power Auctions. WIREs Energy Environ. 2018;e303. https://doi.org/10.1002/wene.303.
Featured in Advanced Science News.
This publication is an extended and revised version of "Bidding Strategies in the Austrian and German Secondary Balancing Power Markets," which appeared in the Proceedings of the 10. Internationale Energiewirtschaftstagung (winner of the “Young Scientists Best Paper Award”).